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It has been recently stated, 'Rhetorical appeals designed to arouse passion are 
inherently coercive; they inhibit the ability to think' (Weiss 1998, 147). Although 
the details of Weiss's position represent a significant departure from traditional 
interpretations, her dismissal of rhetoric is nevertheless shared by many readers 
of the Crito, who tend to view the rhetorical form of the Laws' speech in the dia-
logue as unphilosophical and as an impediment to solving the speech's inherent 
difficulties. This attitude appears to stem from the assumption of an underlying 
reason/rhetoric opposition, which leads to either an implicit or explicit distinction 
between the unphilosophical 'rhetoric' of the Laws and Socrates' 'reasoning', 
both earlier in the dialogue and in other Platonic works. The aim of this article is 
to show that, far from being an unnecessary hindrance to philosophy, the rhetori-
cal structures of argument used within the Laws' speech are in fact essential to 
their construction of a model of reasoning and justice. 
The speech of the Laws of Athens has presented a notorious difficulty to read-
ers of the Crito: how can the Laws' demands for unconditional obedience be rec-
onciled with the views expressed by Plato's Socrates, both in the Crito and 
elsewhere? If Socrates were to accept their demands, his individual actions 
would be subject not to moral reasoning, but to blind obedience, and he would be 
compelled to commit even unjust actions, if ordered to do so by the Laws.! This 
dictate therefore seems incompatible with Socrates' prohibition of injustice 
(49b7) and his advocacy of rational deliberation earlier in theCrito (46b4-6). In a 
wider Platonic context, the most serious difficulty is perhaps the apparent incon-
sistency with the Apology's Socrates, who says that he contravened public 
orders, both during the democracy and the rule of the Thirty, and claims to be 
prepared to so again, if ordered to desist from philosophy.2 These difficulties are 
generally approached, either by proposing a modified interpretation and para-
phrase of the Laws' arguments,3 or by suggesting that their views differ from 
1 Unless of course the Laws' demands were infallibly moral. However. the text does not appear 
to allow for this possibility (see below). 
2 Apology 32a4-e1 and 29c1-30c2 respectively. Much of the literature on the Crito focuses on 
this question, often proposing interpretations of the Laws' speech which render it compatible with the 
Apology. For a formulation of the question see, e.g., Vlastos 1995, 30-31 or Bostock 1990, I; for a 
summary of the debate see, e.g., Brickhouse and Smith 1989, 138; and, for a list of attempts to recon-
cile the Crito and Apology see Colson 1989, 27n1. 
3 See, e.g., Kraut 1984, 6 on the Crito as 'more moderate than its readers have realized'; Kahn 
1989,31-32; Allen 1980; Woozley 1979. 
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those held by Socrates or Plato.4 
Instead of attempting to sweep aside the Laws' rhetoric, I argue that a way of 
understanding the problematic relationship between the views of Socrates as the 
Laws and Socrates in propria persona emerges from a close analysis of this fea-
ture of their speech. I aim to disclose that rather than representing an absolute 
departure from or a straightforward application of the principles suggested by 
Socrates earlier in the dialogue, the Laws' speech, through its rhetoric, is com-
mitted to a consistency model of justice that is itself an expansion and develop-
ment of the earlier ideas. 
Of course, if I am to show that the Laws' reasoning resides in their rhetoric, it 
will first be necessary to challenge the view, so prominent in scholarship on this 
dialogue, that rhetoric is in some way antithetical to reason. Thus, the first two 
sections focus on dismantling this opposition by demonstrating, initially, that 
Socrates' earlier in propria persona points, normally viewed as representative of 
reasoning, are nevertheless full of rhetorical structures of argumentation. Having 
established a lack of easy separation between the two 'poles' of this so-called 
opposition, it is then possible to move on to consider the effects of rhetoric in the 
Laws' speech and its contribution to the reasoning process. 
L Socrates in propria persona: the voice of 'pure' reason? 
The presence of an underlying 'reasonlrhetoric' opposition can be felt in many 
of the works on Plato's Crito: as Allen 1980, 82 says, 'because the speech of the 
Laws is rhetoric, it has been discounted as argument' (see Kraut 1984, 6 for a list 
of those sharing this view). Even for those who are sympathetic to the Laws' 
positions, the actual words in which these are expressed seem to be regarded as 
an impediment to philosophy. Gallop 1998,254, for example, claims that there is 
some 'perfectly defensible' truth within the speech, but only 'if disentangled 
from the fanatical rhetoric that surrounds it' (emphasis mine). 5 Rather than see-
ing the rhetoric of the Laws as integral to their philosophy, readers attempt either 
to dismiss the Laws as non-philosophical or, to 'salvage' the philosophical con-
tent from the apparently non-philosophical form in which it is here conveyed. 
In general, Socrates in propria persona is associated with terms such as 'phi-
losophy', 'dialectic', 'reason', and 'argument', while the Laws' speech is 
4 Cf. Gallop 1998.253-254: Given the unacceptability of the 'authoritarian interpretation of the 
Crito .. . there are, broadly, two strategies for solving its puzzle. One is to dissociate Socrates and Plato 
from the discussion of the Laws. The other is to render the argument of the Laws more palatable'. The 
view that the opinions of the Laws differ from those held by Socrates or Plato is becoming increas-
ingly popular. See, e.g., Weiss 1998, Lane 1998, Harte 1999, Orwin 1988, and West 1989. Various 
reasons have been proposed for such a strategy, but in answer to the suggestion of Weiss 1998. West 
1989, and Young 1974,5-6 that Socrates uses deliberately un-Socratic arguments because Crito can-
not cope with Socratic arguments, we may contend that the persuasion of an interlocutor with false 
arguments would itself be a fundamentally un-Socratic move. Cf. McLaughlin 1976. 188 contra 
Young and also Vlastos 1994,90. 
5 Cf., e.g., Blyth 1996, 17 and Allen 1980, 82. Kraut 1984, 93 says about the city/parent analogy 
argument, 'amidst the rhetoric and emotion there is a perfectly coherent argument'. 
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described as 'rhetoric', 'coercion', 'passion', or 'claims'.6 Weiss 1998, 147 says 
that Socrates gives the Laws' speech because he is forced to exchange his own 
'teaching persuasion' and 'reasoned argument' for the Laws' 'coercion persua-
sion'. Vlastos 1995,32 quotes Grote, calling the speech a regrettable 'harangue', 
and finally, goes so far as to rewrite it, salvaging a little and 'taking out of the 
impassioned homilectics just what will go over into cool argumentative prose'.7 
Conversely, the arguments used by Socrates earlier in the dialogue are either tac-
itly accepted or explicitly presented as examples of good reasoning in compari-
son to the rhetoric of the Laws (e.g., Vlastos 1995, 32, Weiss 1998, West 1989, 
76-77, and Blyth 1996,12). 
Such interpretations of the Crito appear to assume an understanding of reason 
as a paradigm of clear and explicit argumentation, free from the emotional 
manipulation and indeterminacies foisted on it by discourse such as rhetoric. 
Rhetoric, however, appears to be understood in terms of classical rhetoric, in 
which argument is not formalisable, but is based upon verbal devices, irony, 
motifs, and appeals to the emotions (although 'rhetoric' has a variety of mean-
ings, it will be used here in a narrow sense to denote the art defined in classical 
literary theory and exemplified by fifth and fourth century Attic oratory).8 Debate 
over the validity of these conceptions of reasoning and rhetoric, and of the so-
called opposition between them, is of course pertinent to central questions in con-
temporary philosophy and literary theory, concerning the status of philosophical 
6 See, e.g., Bostock 1990, 11-12 on the argument based on the city/parent analogy: 'though 
really it does not deserve to be called an argument, but is simply a claim'; Blyth 1996, 13: 'finally 
they [the Laws] give commands and warnings, revealing fully their true non-philosophical character, 
which they have hardly managed to conceal throughout with a veneer of dialectic'; Gallop 1998,254-
255, on 5Ia-c: 'the Laws insist, in an odious burst of patriotic rhetoric'; White 1996,98, on the Laws' 
speech as 'a series of conclusory declarations, with very little argument to support them, and that 
mostly, though not entirely, of low quality'; Santas 1979,55 describes the Laws' speech as 'passion-
ate pleading, emotional overwriting, overstating and over-arguing'. Even McNeal 1992, 76, who 
states the necessity of resisting an 'antithetical separation of dialectic and rhetoric', still accepts an 
'analytic phiiosophy'/'rhetoric' distinction; and Kahn 1989,35 ponders 'as a work of philosophical 
rhetoric it is surely very successful. But how good is it as an argument?'; West 1989,77 observes: 
'well aware of Crito's inability to attend to the sweet voice of reason, Socrates turns from philosophi-
cal argument to philosophical rhetoric'. 
7 Cf. Kahn, 1989, 40: 'I conclude, with much hesitation, that Plato has here allowed the Laws to 
be carried too far along by the force of their own rhetoric, and that there is from the philosophical 
point of view, no hope of salvaging this passage' . 
8 The reasOn/rhetoric opposition is, of course, nothing new. Rhetoric has been at odds with phi-
losophy since its inception (see, e.g., Vickers 1989, 83) and, although the debate has gone through 
many revisions, according to the shifting identity and roles of both philosophy and rhetoric, there still 
exists a prominent view that philosophy is in some way opposed to rhetoric (see. e.g., Ijsseling 1976, 
5-6). Wardy 1996,56 says, 'Nowadays the term "rhetoric" tend[s] to suggest, in ordinary parlance. no 
more than the dissembling, manipulative abuse of linguistic resources for self-serving ends; outside 
certain antiquarian and literary critical coteries, the word is unfailingly pejorative'. Although it is the 
features of classical rhetoric within the Laws' speech which lead to its categorisation as rhetoric. the 
broader modern understanding of the term 'rhetoric' also seems to have influenced many critiques of 
the Laws' speech. 
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discourse as a whole.9 While these more general questions exceed the scope of 
this article, I show that in the case of the Crito such an opposition is neither a fair 
nor a useful framework on which to base an understanding of Socrates' argu-
ments. 
My first step towards dismantling this opposition is to reveal that the use of 
'rhetorical' methods of argument is not exclusive to Socrates when speaking as 
the Laws, but is also to be found in the earlier part of the dialogue. The argu-
ments that Socrates voices here, in propria persona, are usually considered to 
represent the genuine Socratic or Platonic/Socratic position. 
Early on Socrates argues that a change in circumstances should not lead him to 
abandon his principles and be swayed by the opinion of the many (0111:0AAo{). 
He asks, 
Is it always correct to say this or not: that it is necessary to pay 
attention to some opinions, but not to others? Or were we right 
(KuAm<; EA€"(E'w) before I was condemned to death, whereas it 
has now been made clear that we were talking merely for the 
sake of argument (EVeKU AO"(ou) and, in truth, [our words] 
were really play and nonsense? (46c8-d5; cf. 46b6ff. and 
49a7ff.) 
The implication of the irony in Socrates' words is that it is in fact preposterous to 
suppose that an ethical principle such as this can change because of external cir-
cumstances. Using strategies familiar from Greek oratory, he exploits the differ-
ence between words and actions (for parallels in Greek oratory, see n24). 
Furthermore, this type of argument, which suggests that rules of behaviour 
should not change because the passage of time brings altered circumstances, is 
categorised by Aristotle Rhetoric ii 23 as a 'rhetorical proof' (EVeU~T\~u) based 
on 'consideration of time' (EK 'tou Xpovov crK011:elV). 
As we can see from this example, Socrates is not averse to the use of irony. His 
comment that, since Crito is not to die tomorrow, 'the present misfortune (cru~­
<popa) would not lead you [Crito] astray' provides a particularly sharp example 
(47al).10 The heavy irony of this remark lies in the fact that, quite contrary to its 
literal implications, Crito's emotions have actually led him far astray from ratio-
nal enquiry, while Socrates' own powers of ethical deliberation remain unaf-
fected. ll Moreover, Socrates also seems to employ word-play, exploiting the 
ambiguity of the term cru~<popa ('misfortune'), which can have a neutral or posi-
tive sense, in addition to its more normal negative one. If Crito construes it as 
negative, as seems likely, this in itself indicates an attitude to the present circum-
9 Thoughts on the limitations of analytic philosophical logic are by no means restricted to 
philosophers such as Derrida or Rorty. On the unhelpfulness of logic in ethics in particular see, e.g., 
Nagel 1986. 154, who nevertheless does not accept relativist scepticism. 
10 Weiss 1998. 131 sees 'sarcasm and bitter scorn and mockery' as distinguishing features of the 
Laws' speech. Yet, in these two examples surely such terms could equally be applied to Socrates' 
ironic mockery of both himself and Crito. 
I! For the pejorative sense of <n)~HpOp& see, e.g., Aeschylus Sept. 4-5. 
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stances that Socrates would view as irrational. 
In the same passage, Socrates' point is underscored by the suggestion that the 
so-called 'misfortunes' that face him at the hands of the people are not worthy of 
serious consideration. He gives no evidence or explanation for the irrelevance of 
the physical and material punishments, that can be inflicted through their power, 
but instead compares the fear that they induce to a child's fear of goblins: 
I shall not give way to you, not even if, just as children are ter-
rified by goblins (ro07tEP 7tatOa~ fJj.la~ j.l0Pj.lOA{yttlltat), the 
power of the people (fJ trov 7tOAArov Ouvaj.ll~) should confront 
us with even more terrors, threatening us with imprisonments 
and deaths and confiscations of property. (46c3-6) 
This comparison implies that the power of the people and their punishments are 
illusory, and that to fear them displays a lack of insight.I2 A similar implication 
lies in Socrates' later suggestion that if he and Crito renege on their former agree-
ments, they will behave like children rather than with the integrity and tenacity 
appropriate to men of their age: 'Or have all those former agreements of ours dis-
solved in these few days, and all this time have we failed to see that, although we 
are such old men, when we talked things over in earnest, we were really no dif-
ferent from children?' (49a7-bl). Rhetoric often employs varying types of com-
parison. Isocrates Panegyricus 121, for example, laments the Athenians' 
subjugation to the Persian King, asking: 'Do we not sail off to him, as to a master 
(ro07tEP 7tpO~ O£07tOtllv), when we have complaints against each other? Do we 
not address him as "the Great King", as though we were his captives (ro07tEP 
atXj.laAoJtOl)?' Likewise Aristotle Rhetoric ii 20. 1393a30-31 and 1393b4-8 cate-
gorises comparison (7tapa~oA~) as one of two types of invented examples used 
in rhetorical proofs. 
Even extended pieces of argumentation in the Crito exhibit rhetorical features. 
Socrates begins his argument against Crito (47a2-48al0) by claiming the neces-
sity of considering only the opinion of the 'sole person who knows about justice 
and injustice and the opinion of truth herself' (6 E7ta'{rov 7tEpt trov OtKatrov Kat 
aOtKrov, 6 Et~, Kat aut" ;, aA~eEta, 48a6).13 His first step is to establish that the 
opinions of wise men alone should be esteemed and, accordingly, an athlete's 
sole concern should be the opinions of the trainer, who knows how to benefit the 
body, unlike the the many, whose ignorance might lead to harmful advice. He 
then reaches his conclusion in the following way: 
Socrates: So is our life worth living if the body is worthless 
and destroyed? 
12 For a similar example see Phd. 77e4ff., where Cebes asks Socrates to persuade the 'child 
within him', so that he will not fear death like goblins (J.l~ odhtva 1 -rov 8avawv Ol<J7tEP tex J.lop-
J.lOA:lll<:EtCl). 
13 Although to 01KCll0V and to iiOtKOV as are conventionally translated as 'right' and 'wrong' 
here, I translate these terms and their cognates as 'justice' and 'injustice' because 'justice' is a central 
concept within the dialogue and a consistent translation may capture the nuances of the Greek more 
successfully. 
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Crito: In no way. 
Socrates: But is our life worth living when that which injus-
tice maims, but justice benefits, is destroyed? Or do we think 
that the part of us, whatever it is, which is concerned with 
jutice and injustice, is less important than the body? 
Crito: In no way. 
Socrates: More important then? 
Crito: Much more. 
Socrates: Then, my dear man, we must not worry at all about 
what the many will say of us, but rather about what the one 
man who knows about justice and injustice and truth herself 
will say. (47e3-48a7) 
According to Socrates here, given that it is right to listen only to the expert in 
matters concerning the body, the same must follow for matters of the soul, this 
being far more important than the body.14 This ajortiori reasoning (cf. Blyth 
1996, 3) uses a type of argument familiar from rhetoric and, once again, classi-
fied by Aristotle Rhetoric ii 23.1397a23-27 as a type of 'rhetorical proof', 
namely, the 'more or the less', whereby if a lesser case admits of something the 
same will also hold for the greater and vice versa. 
The argument rests on a number of unjustified assumptions, such as the exis-
tence of a part of us, presumably the soul, that is 'injured by injustice and bene-
fited by justice'. Likewise it is further assumed that the effects of justice and 
injustice on the soul are analogous to those of health and disease on the body and 
that the soul has a far greater worth (cf. Allen 1980,70 and Young 1997, 18). As 
with Socrates' dismissal of the physical or material consequences of punishment, 
the relative inconsequentiality of the body is simply implied through comparison. 
Finally, whereas athletics provides empirical evidence that an expert exists, who 
can be trained to understand what is good and bad for the body, there is no such 
evidence to support the positing of such an expert for the soul. The Laws' speech 
has been criticised both for its general reliance on unsubstantiated assumptions 
and for its analogy of the city as parent or master, which is felt to be unsatisfac-
tory in various respects. IS Yet it seems that Socrates' earlier argumentation is 
also reliant on assumptions and analogies, that are themselves open to question 
(Young 1997, 14ff.). 
While another reason the Laws' speech is seen as rhetoric is their use of 
appeals to the emotions,16 emotive manipulation of subject matter is also to be 
14 I have taken 'that part of us, whatever it is, which is concerned with justice and injustice' to 
refer to the soul, the generally accepted interpretation. See below, however, on the possible signifi-
cance of the use of this phrase. 
15 E.g., Bostock 1990, II, Kraut 1984, 107, and esp. West 1989,77, who sees Socrates' use here 
of 'an uncharacteristic figure of speech' and un-Socratic analogy as a reason not to take the speech as 
a direct statement of Socrates' own 'political theory'. 
16 E.g., Allen 1980, 82, Blyth 1996, 17, Kraut 1984, 93, and Santas 1979,55. For general com-
ments on persuasion through emotion as part of rhetoric, see, e.g., Phdr. 267c7ff. and Aristotle Rhet. 
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found within Socrates' in propria persona arguments. So, the argument for lis-
tening to the 'moral expert' establishes its main point within the unemotive and 
mundane context of athletics. 
Socrates: So must [the athlete] practise, train, eat and drink, 
in the way which the one man who knows and is an expert 
thinks is right, rather than the way which everybody else thinks 
is right. 
Crito: That is so. (47b9-12) 
However, once this first example has proved the importance of listening exclu-
sively to the expert in physical matters, Socrates goes on to consider ethical cases 
(47c8ff.). The principle itself, that one should only heed the expert, would have 
been established sufficiently, simply by showing that an alternative course of 
action leads to some degree of harm. Yet, Socrates picks up on Crito's OtOAAU<H 
(47c7), and slips unquestioningly to a discussion of extreme cases, in which the 
body or soul is so corrupt that it is unfit to live (47c8-48al; cf. Young 1997,21-
22). In this way the point becomes neatly ad hominem. For Socrates, it is of 
course his life that is at stake, if he chooses to abide by this principle and disre-
gard the opinion of 'the many'. Thus the suggestion that contravention of the 
principle is not only incorrect, but would render life unlivable, frames the argu-
ment within a context far more pertinent to Socrates' situation than the earlier 
more general point. This stage of the argument now plays on Crito's emotions, 
since its principle appears to be of central importance to the future of Socrates' 
life, the very subject which is the cause of Crito' s considerable distress. 
With respect to the dynamics of argument some readers have suggested that, as 
an interlocutor, Crito makes an active contribution to the discussion in this part of 
the dialogue, in contrast to his minimal and passive role later, during the Laws' 
speech. Blyth 1996, 12-13 contrasts Crito's 'substantial' contributions here with 
his remarks during the Laws' speech, where Crito is 'reduced to a minimum of 
assent', claiming that this mirrors the 'dialectic' /'rhetoric' opposition that sepa-
rates the earlier and later parts.I1 However, although Crito does make numeri-
cally more responses in Socrates' earlier argument, these are merely the same 
short statements of unquestioning assent as those he gives during the Laws' 
speech. For example, in the short passage discussed above (47e4ff.), Crito's 
replies actually consist of 'in no way' (ouOallro~), 'in no way' (oUOallro~), and 
'much more' (7tOAU ye): hardly the so-called 'substantial contributions' to the 
reasoning process, that could be felt to distinguish this passage as non-rhetorical 
dialectic. 
As a final and more general point, another reason given as to why the Laws 
should be seen as rhetoric is their reliance on unsubstantiated claims as opposed 
to reasoning. IS Yet the founding principles of the earlier discussion, such as 
ii 1-17. 
17 Cf. West 1989,77 on the Laws' 'philosophical rhetoric': 'Crito will no longer be required to 
ask or answer questions' . 
18 E.g., Bostock 1990, 11, White 1996,98. Weiss 1998, 133: 'The Laws jump from unfounded 
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injustice being invariably bad for its agent (49b4) and the necessity of keeping to 
just agreements (4ge6), are also ostensibly unproven and could therefore be seen 
as claims, even though their initial assertion is couched in the form of rhetorical 
questions (cf. Young 1974, 10). Of course, the harmfulness of injustice and the 
benefits of justice for its agent are argued for extensively in dialogues such as the 
Gorgias and Republic, while Socrates himself suggests in the Crito that he and 
Crito have already reached agreeement on these points at some other time (49d5-
e4).19 Yet, this does not detract from the fact that, in the context of the Crito 
itself, no explicit proof for such principles is presented. 
Thus it appears that the earlier part of the dialogue, which has been taken as 
representative of 'philosophical argument' or 'reasoning', is also dependent on 
the claims, assumptions, analogies, and appeals to the emotion associated with 
rhetoric (cf. West 1989, 77). Moreover, such features appear integral to the rea-
soning process. This is not to suggest that the presence of these features renders 
this passage in any way less philosophical, but instead to propose the need for a 
more inclusive conception of philosophical argumentation, that incorporates a 
wider range of argumentative structures. Arguments must be considered in indi-
vidual terms rather than rejected generally because of their use of rhetoric. Such 
analysis surely presents problems for the reason/rhetoric opposition view of 
Socrates' two personae in the Crito, problems that will be compounded when it 
appears that the Laws' speech itself, usually seen as steeped in rhetoric, cannot 
actually be dismissed as irrational or non-philosophical. 
II. Rhetoric as reason in the Laws' speech 
Socrates says, 'For one might say many things, especially if one were an orator 
(&AAro~ 'tE ]((Xl I'>TJ'trop), about the destruction of this law' (50b6-8). The classifi-
cation of the speech of the Laws of Athens as rhetoric, thus suggested by 
Socrates in propria persona, certainly seems justifiable.2o In its use of appeals to 
emotion, its motifs, and verbal devices, it is extremely dependent on the tech-
niques associated with oratory. 21 For example, the Laws use Socrates' past 
actions as evidence ('tEKI-lTJpta)22 and rely on mockery, antithesis, rhetorical 
premises to wild conclusions'. 
19 This may be felt to provide the missing justification for the Crito's prohibition of injustice. On 
the idea that the Crito is protreptic for the notion of justice in the Republic, see, e.g., Harte 1999, 145 
and Kahn 1989,41. 
20 I oppose Weiss 1998, 86-87, who claims that Socrates' explicit linking of the Laws and the 
words of an orator 'decisively dissociates himself from the speech of the Laws'. Lane 1998, 323 
holds similarly to Weiss: 'the crucial shift comes when Socrates begins to speak, not immediately for 
the laws, but for Crito, and for an unnamed orator "on behalf of this law'" . 
21 Cf. Harte 1999, 137: 'Many parallels can be found in the rhetoric of the day for the argumen-
tative strategy of the Laws'. She cites a number of contemporary rhetorical parallels for the analogy 
of city as family or household. 
22 On 'tEKllnpta as an integral part of rhetoric, see Phdr. 266e3. For examples of appeals to'tEK-
Il-rlPta in rhetoric, see, e.g., Lys. 4.12; Thuc. ii 39.2. 
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questions, and impassioned commands and appeals,23 as well as many other fea-
tures of oratory. They appeal to the conventionallogoslergon opposition, claim-
ing that Socrates agreed to be ruled by them in deed and not in word (Epyq:> ex'A.'A.' 
ou 'A.oyq:>, 52d6).24 In addition, parallels can be found for some of the Laws' 
themes. Similarly to the Laws' point that Socrates claimed to choose 'death 
before exile' (52c7), in On the Mysteries 1-5, Andocides also claims that he 
would rather face laws than exile. He later adds that those who did flee thereby 
condemned themselves (01. of: OLXOVtat <pEuYOVtE~, <:r<pwv autwv KatayvovtE~ 
exOtKElv, On the Mysteries 49-50; cf. Lys. 20.21) just like the Laws' point (53b8) 
that, by fleeing, Socrates confirms for the judges that their guilty verdict was cor-
rect.25 
The use of rhetorical techniques therefore appears both indisputable and preva-
lent. At the same time, the implications of the speech's verbal form are rarely 
considered in any detail. Discussions of the Laws' speech mainly revolve around 
their initial claims that it is the citizen's duty either to 'persuade or obey' the 
Laws (51b4) and that the relationship of citizen to state is analogous to that of the 
child to their parents or the slave to his master (50elff.). These ideas are then 
sometimes used as the basis for a more general theoretical debate about political 
philosophy and obligation (see, e.g., Woozley 1979, ch. 4 and Kraut 1984, chs. 3-
5). The remainder of the speech often receives less attention and, as a whole, it is 
treated with paraphrase or perfunctory summary (e.g., Vlastos 1995,32-33, Kahn 
1989,33, Woozley 1979,79, Kraut 1984,177, Miller 1996,126-127), and extra-
textual examples (e.g., Vlastos 1995, 35, Kraut 1984, 152-154, Gallop 1998, 
251-252). 
If rather than attempting to minimise the implications of the sty Ie of discourse, 
we closely analyse this rhetoric itself, interesting ideas and themes are pushed 
into prominence. It is possible to see how the rhetoric of the Laws' speech is an 
important aspect of their philosophical methodology. 
I focus on the language of the section of the Laws' speech including the so-
called 'argument from agreement' that has received little detailed critical atten-
tion (52bl-53a8). Here the Laws try to prove that, by remaining in Athens, 
Socrates has implicitly agreed to obey their orders. They begin by stressing the 
'great evidence' (I-lEYa.'A.cx tEKl-lllpta) that they and the city have been pleasing to 
Socrates: on <:rm Kat 1)I-lEl~ l)PE<:rKOI-lEV Kat 1) 1tO'A.li; (52b2), recalling 51d4 and 
23 Countless examples could be given of all these features. For mockery see, e.g., Antipho Invec-
tive Against Alcibiades, Athenaeus 12.525b; Lys. 12.34. For antithesis see. e.g., Gorgias DK B 11.1, 
Thrasymachus DK BI, and Kennedy 1963, 64ff. For rhetorical questions see Gorgias B11.20; 
Antipho On the Chorus-boy 49; Isoc. PanegyricusI62;. Dernosthenes 01.3.16-17. For impassioned 
commands and appeals, see And. 011 the Mysteries 149 and Lys. 9.22. 
24 See, e.g., Lys. 12.33. This distinction is, of course, not restricted to oratory and also appears in 
earlier examples of historiography and tragedy: e.g. Hdt. vi 38, Thuc. i 128.3, Soph. OT 517, Aesc. 
PV 336. I explain below why the Laws' appeal to Socrates' Epya is of especial significance. 
25 Another parallel is Gorg. B.lla.21 where he argues that, even in exile, the barbarians would 
know of his crimes and would not trust him (cf. Crito 53b5ff.). 
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d7, in which the Laws stated that departure from the city was pennissible, if they 
and the city were displeasing. This statement is pivotal to the passage and is 
echoed in various contexts throughout, producing a fuller picture of what the 
agreement involves. 
52b6 contains a similar phrase, while 52c3 presents having children in the city 
as evidence that the city is pleasing: w~ apE(jK01)(jT\~ (jot til~ 1t6AEo)~. In 52e4 the 
idea of the Laws as pleasing is associated with the agreement to abide by them: 
there were seventy years in which Socrates could have left, the Laws say, 'if we 
had not pleased you (d !l~ llPE(jKoIlEV 'hIlEl~) or if the agreements had not 
seemed just'. In the conclusion to this tEKIll]Pta section, ring composition recalls 
the opening phrase: 'so it is clear that the city and we Laws pleased you excep-
tionally amongst Athenians-after all, who could find any city pleasing unless it 
had Laws?' (53a3-5). While this intensifies the Laws' point, the rhetorical ques-
tion 'who could find any city pleasing unless it had Laws?' also evokes once 
again the close association of city and laws suggested both explicitly and implic-
itly throughout the passage, and provides a reason why remaining in the city is to 
be construed as showing allegiance to the Laws. The repeti,Yve nature of this pas-
sage emphasises the central significance of the Laws' having pleased Socrates, as 
well as adding the proofs and implications of this point. 
The Laws' being pleasing (apE(jK£lv) provides a clear principle that can be 
inferred from the language of this passage. The foundations of this principle 
emerge in 51dff. where it is claimed that although no citizen is forced to remain 
in Athens, if he does so, it will be seen as evidence that the city is pleasing to him 
(apE(jKEtv) and, accordingly, he will obey its Laws' dictates. apE(jKE1V is gener-
ally used in contexts where it implies pragmatic satisfaction (e.g., Soph. Ant. 211, 
Thuc. ii 68.3, Hdt. viii 19). Evidence that this condition is applicable is inferred 
from behaviour such as remaining in the city or bearing children in the city. In 
this way the agreement involved in the apE(jK£lv principle hinges on the tight 
association of Laws and polis, so that residence is taken to denote ethical com-
mitment (contra Kraut 1984, 189). At 52c 'to be sufficient' (iKavo~ dvat) is 
substituted for 'to be pleasing' apE(jKEtv and this notion of pragmatic sufficiency 
appears to be at the heart of the Laws' principle.26 Socrates sees the Laws as pro-
viding not a faultless system of justice but rather a body of authority that is gen-
erally satisfactory. Even though they demand absolute obedience, the Laws do 
not appear to assert their own faultlessness. 
The conditions of this apE(jKE1V principle may well seem debatable. The very 
idea that pragmatic sufficiency deserves absolute obedience appears to involve a 
fundamental asymmetry between the comparatively weak basis for the commit-
ment and the level of obedience that this requires (cf. Young 1974,21). In 
response to this objection, this asymmetry could perhaps be seen as an important 
26 Weiss 1998, 119 claims, however, that the Laws misrepresent Socrates' real reasons for 
remaining in Athens: 'he chose death over exile not because of his great love for Athens and its 
Laws'. 
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indication of the imbalances involved in the relationship of citizen to state (ct. 
Harte 1999, 123 and Kraut 1984, 107), rather than a methodological weakness. 
But beyond this, the use here of the terms 'assymetry' or 'imbalance' could 
themselves be questioned. For 'imbalance' suggests that the potential results of 
absolute obedience to the Laws outweigh the benefits the citizen receives from 
living under a satisfactory legal system. However, given that the dictates of the 
Laws only appear to be capable of affecting men on a material basis, this surely 
attributes undue significance to the type of material consequences that Socrates 
has already suggested are relatively unimportant.27 So it is unclear, at least for 
Socrates, that the consequences of absolute obedience to the Laws conclusively 
outweigh the benefits of living within a society with satisfactory Laws,28 and 
accordingly, this apparent inbalance does not necessarily constitute ethical asym-
metry. 
The Laws' inference of agreement from action might also seem to raise ques-
tions, concerning the nature of the relationship between reasoning and action as 
well as how the specific motivation behind an action can be inferred correctly. 
Lane 1998,326, while allowing the interrelation of deeds and words for Socrates, 
nevertheless claims a distinction between 'agreements-in-action' and 'agree-
ments-in-argument': 'his argumentative commitments about what to do and what 
not to do must be translated through deliberation into action'. She continues that, 
even though both types of agreement incidentally lead towards the same conclu-
sion concerning whether escape is unjust, ultimately 'the path of argument' has 
priority for Socrates, whereas 'the path appealing to actions .. .is not the right kind 
of path to determine action for the reflective person' (Lane 1998, 329-330). 
However, such a disjunction between words and actions seems doubtful in the 
Crito, Plato's only dialogue of explicit practical deliberation, in which the inte-
gral connection of reasoning and action is stressed throughout (see, e.g., 46b3-4, 
48b5, 48blO-c2). For Socrates, it seems rather, that deeds should be understood 
as a direct product of reasoning, so that they could then be seen as just as valid an 
indication of commitment as A.OYOl themselves.29 As for the question of how 
27 The Laws suggest that Socrates' obedience may even lead, e.g .• to death by execution (51a3); 
injury or death in war (5Ib7); imprisonment (5Ib6). Nevertheless. Socrates has already suggested 
that death and imprisonment are as inconsequential as childrens' imaginary objects of fear (46c4) and 
that the prolonging of life per se is of no great value (4Sal0-b5). 
28 On possible benefits of obedience to the Laws. see Vlastos 1995, 3S. 
29 This question has also been considered in terms of the relative status of A.6YOI and £pya. Weiss 
1998. 115 claims that it is clear from Ap. 32aS-9 'that Socrates holds "proofs in deed" generally in 
low esteem, viewing them as "vulgar things, typical of the law courts"', a point she reiterates on p. 
123. However, while Socrates does say EPro Sf U!-lIV <pOp'tlKfx !-lEV Kai SIKavlKu, it is firstly not clear 
that this description is unequivocally pejorative; and, more importantly, he then concludes the sen-
tence with aAl16i1 15E. showing that he clearly considers 'proofs in deed' to be legitimate. Lane 1998. 
325-326 also discusses this question. Although she accepts that both Myot and Epya may have posi-
tive and negative values for Plato, she maintains that 'deeds, not words, seem to be what matter to the 
jurors and to the Laws', and ultimately suggests that this is contrary to Socrates who is more con-
cerned with words (330). I am not suggesting (as Lane says in n30) that Myot and Epya should be 
harmonized, but rather that their respective values for Socrates and Plato must be assessed in individ-
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beliefs can be inferred from actions with certainty,3o a possible response might 
lie in the identity of the speaker. Since it is Socrates himself who is speaking 
through the persona of the Laws, it seems probable that the Laws would give an 
accurate representation of Socrates' true motivations. 31 
A general strategy of the Laws is also to stress the contrast between Socrates' 
avowed intentions and the hypothetical escape, with devices such as the 'now/ 
then' (vuvh:6-n:) antithesis in 52c5-6: '[it was possible] then to do with the state's 
assent what you are now setting out to do without it' .32 Similarly, there is a 'then/ 
but now' (ton: Ilev/vuv Oe) antithesis at 52c6-8, that ironically compares 
Socrates' boasts that he would prefer death to exile with a decision to flee instead 
of face death. 33 In the next main section, that envisages the consequences of 
Socrates' escape, the Laws speculate about the contents of his future discussions, 
asking 'which words (11.0,,(01)<;), Socrates? Those which you use here-about how 
virtue and justice are the most important things for men, and legality and the 
laws?' (53c6ff.). They contrast Socrates' customary logoi with the projected 
escape that would betray them, a point repeated by implication in a very similar 
rhetorical question at 53e6ff. Elements of word play also suggest Socrates' 
inconsistency. Having called escape 'indecent' (aoXIWov), the Laws then imag-
ine Socrates' escape in disguise, 'even changing your own appearance' (Kat to 
OX~lla to oamou IlEtaA.A.al;a<;, 53d7). The earlier use of aschbnoll (53c9) to 
mean 'indecent' suggests that schema need not simply denote physical appear-
ance. Thus the external change that Socrates must adopt in order to escape could 
also be seen to have an internal aspect, especially in light of the emphasis on 
Socrates' inconsistency. 
The Laws' objections revolve around the idea that Socrates' escape would be 
inconsistent with the ethical principles that he has revealed both implicitly in his 
actions and explicitly in his words. From this it is possible to see the Laws' 
speech as relevant to the theoretical questions of what constitutes the foundation 
or sources of ethical principles and how the consistency of a particular action 
with such principles can then be assessed. Furthermore, these concerns are piv-
otal not only to this passage, but to the issues of the dialogue as a whole. 
The importance of self-consistency is introduced when Crito suggests that 
ual contexts and cannot be taken as objectively determinate. As further counter-examples to Lane see, 
e.g., Ap. 32a8-9; Socrates' disparaging use of ~VEK<X A.6Y01J (Crito 46d4): EVEK<X r..oY01J f} .. f.y£'CO, ~v 8e 
1tatOUX Kat <pA1Japta w~ o.Alleiii~; and Socrates' point at Ap. 17b2 that the lies that his accusers have 
spoken, will be proved untrue in deed (£PYQl). 
30 See, e.g., the objections raised by Vlastos 1995,36-37 and Weiss 1998, 114. Cf. also Kraut 
1984, 179-180 and 171-172, on the problems of making agreements based on 'inner satisfaction' as 
opposed to 'observable behaviour'. 
31 Cf. V1astos 1994, 90: 'since [the Laws) are Socrates' mouthpiece-what they say is what he 
makes them say-the sentiments they impute to him must be his own'. Unless one believes that 
Socrates has reasons for concealing these from Crito. See, e.g., Weiss 1998; West 1989; Miller 1996; 
Young 1974; and my n4. 
32 The aKoucr1l9i:Koucrll~ opposition also gives further verbal emphasis to this contrast. 
33 Note also the echoing of nun at 53a6. 
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Socrates' non-escape would be unjust and would actually contradict his lifelong 
concern for virtue (45c6-d9). While Socrates then challenges the view that non-
escape is wrong, he still uses the same type of argument in the in propria persona 
passages discussed above. Here, answering Crito and prefiguring the Laws, he 
stresses the importance of maintaining principles, in spite of difficult circum-
stances (see 46bff. and 49a7). 
The structures of argument used by the Laws to demonstrate the inconsistency 
of Socrates' escape reveal strong connections with these earlier parts. In a tone of 
irony and even contempt, the Laws exploit the difference between his words and 
actions and criticise the change of principles, resultin~ from a change in circum-
stances (e.g., 52c5 and 53c6), recalling Socrates' earlier in propria persona 
attempts to persuade Crito that former commitments must remain firm. 
Both Socrates' in propria persona principles and those of the Laws appeal to 
logos and homologia, although it may appear that the former are based on justice 
whereas the latter rely on blind obedience. Nevertheless, the Laws do claim that 
their agreement is based on Socrates' belief that it is just (52e4ff.).34 Moreover, 
as seen, in both voices Socrates assumes the moral rectitude of his principles 
without giving explict substantiation. Principles such as the prohibition of 
wrongdoing or even the necessity of keeping to just agreements are merely 
agreed to by Socrates and Crito, without ostensible justification. Thus, the lack of 
explicit moral foundation for the claims of the Laws highlights a gap already 
existing in the earlier part of the dialogue. 
Another notable feature in the Laws' speech is the varied modes of repetition, 
such as the series of similarly formulated phrases that emphasise the extraordi-
nary extent to which Socrates has remained in the city. These reiterate the fact 
that he would never have acted throughout life as he has, if his commitment to 
Athens was not exceptionally strong. The phrases, that run from 52b3, are struc-
tured around ou ya.p av 1ton: ... ; OUt£ ... 1tW1tOt£; out£ aAAoa£ ouoalloa£; 
OUt£ ... 1tW1tot£, and their cumulative effect is to foreground the extreme degree 
of Socrates' commitment, a point restated at 53a2, where Socrates is said to have 
left Athens even less than those prevented by physical disability. The exceptional 
degree of his commitment is further highlighted by the repeated use of 
~ha<p£povtoo<; (exceptionally) twice in 52b4 and again in 53a4, where we learn 
that he, exceptionally among all Athenians has found the Laws pleasing. 
Yet, as well as acting as a criticism of the potential inconsistency implicit in 
Socrates' imagined escape, the Laws' emphasis on the extraordinary extent to 
which Socrates has remained in the city and is therefore understood to have 
agreed to their principles also implies that the Laws measure consistency with 
ethical principles in terms of degree and not absolute adherence or contraven-
tion. 35 The implication is, since Socrates is exceptional in his remaining, he is 
34 See Harte 1999, 129: 'What is less often noted is that Crito and the Laws, no less than 
Socrates himself, argue in terms of what it is just for Socrates to do'. 
35 Cf. Kraut 1984, 167, who objects that the 'authoritarian reading' of the Crito, would render 
these matters of degree irrelevant. 
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also exceptionally obligated to obedience to the Laws. This suggests that ethical 
principles might not in fact be absolutes, but more or less applicable according to 
circumstances, an idea already present in some of the Crdo' s earlier points. For 
example, Socrates claimed in propria persona that since life is not worth living if 
the body is ruined, it will certainly not be worth living if the soul, which is more 
important, is ruined (47eff.); an argument that also appears to depend upon a 
principle with different degrees of applicability. 
III. What constitutes injustice in the Crito? 
The methodological similarities between the arguments of Socrates in propria 
persona and Socrates as the Laws serve to draw attention to certain issues of eth-
ical methodology, as well as showing the difficulties of assessing the philosophi-
cal status of an argument on the basis of form or style. However, a closer 
examination of the significant differences that also exist between these two parts 
will show that the Laws can be seen not simply to reiterate the earlier points, but 
also to provide a substantial development of them. 
The focal point of Socrates' earlier arguments appears to be the prohibition of 
injustice. Socrates establishes that to do injustice is bad and shameful (KOXQV Kat 
aiO'xpov: 49b4) and that therefore, one must never do injustice (a01KEtv) or do 
injustice in return (aV'ta01KE1V). His two other main points are the importance of 
listening to the moral expert (48a5ff.) and the necessity of fulfilling agreements if 
the task agreed to is just (4ge5ff.); both of which also depend upon the normative 
value of the terms 'justice' and 'injustice' and their cognates. The former hinges 
on the importance of what readers generally understand to be the soul, but is 
actually called 'that part of us, whatever it is, which is concerned with justice and 
injustice' (7tEpt 0 t\ 'tE a01Kta Kat" OlKalOO'UVTJ EO"ttV: 48al),36 while the latter 
depends upon the things which were agreed being just (OtKWa ov'ta: 4ge6). 
Yet, these points are themselves too general to be of application, with no gi ven 
indication of how justice or injustice are to be identified and used as criteria in 
practical deliberation.3? Immediately before the introduction of the Laws, Crito is 
unable to answer Socrates' question whether escape without persuading the city 
will harm 'those it is most wrong to harm' and will keep to just agreements. As 
well as a possible indication of Crito's ideological differences or lack of philo-
sophical ability,38 Crito's puzzlement can also be seen to reveal the need for fur-
ther explanation.39 It then remains for the Laws' elaboration and development of 
36 The moral expert is described as 'the one who understands justice and injustice (0 E7tC:xliwv 
1tEpt 1mv /)U((xtWV Kat ,mv a/)tKWv: 48a7). 
37 Cf. Harte 1999, 131, who comments on 'how incredibly general are the agreements that he 
[Crito] and Socrates have made. Two people could ... quite readily agree that one should live rightly 
and justly. but have entirely different conceptions of what living rightly and justly consists in'. 
38 As suggested by, e.g., Weiss 1998,80 and Lane 1998,322. 
39 Cf. Young 1974, 11, who says that Socrates' principles here 'tell us nothing about what counts 
as dikaion and therefore seem to be of no help in answering the questions Socrates has posed'; 'Crito 
dropped out of the conversation because he could not see how those principles applied to Socrates' 
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the earlier principles to show how they might be applied in these particular cir-
cumstances. 
These problems of generality even extend to the principle of non-retaliation 
that immediately precedes the Laws' speech and seems central to it. For, it seems 
that the argument as stated can be characterised in two ways: either as simply 
recasting the prohibition of injustice or, as a ban on retaliation that is far too gen-
eral to be applicable to the questions under consideration.4o 
On the first reading, the prohibition of av'ta01KEtV (to do injustice in return) 
might well be seen to contribute no new information to the text, even though it is 
usually considered as a radical depature from the norms of contemporary Greek 
morality (see Vlastos 1991, 194ff.; cf. Kahn 1989,41). Socrates' claim that 'even 
the victim of injustice must not do injustice in return, as the majority believe, 
since injustice is entirely forbidden' (49b9ff.) is normally understood to prohibit 
the retaliation considered as acceptable by the many (49c 10-d2). Yet, since it has 
been established that a01KEtV (to do injustice) is wrong, this term retains its pejo-
rative force when used in the compound av'ta81KEtv. Thus the prohibition of 
aVta01KE1V only bans retaliation that involves doing injustice (i.e., if it is an 
instance of a81KEtv), a fact self-evident from the prohibition of a81KEtV (see 
Bostock 1990, 5n6, Vlastos 1991, 197, Young 1997, 13). This neither provides a 
criterion for distinguishing unjust acts of retaliation nor shows that acts of retali-
ation that the many would consider justified are in fact illegitimate retaliation 
acts of av'ta81KEtv. Even though Socrates might intend av'ta81KEtV to refer to 
the very acts that the many consider to be legitimate retaliation, they could surely 
argue that the very fact that the retaliatory nature of such acts changes their moral 
status, so that they no longer constitute instances of a81KEtV and, accordingly, 
cannot be classified and condemned as av'ta81KEtv. If we are to understand the 
prohibition of av'ta81KEtV as a departure from the morals of the many, it must be 
seen implicitly to comprise acts that they would not consider to be unjust, 
because committed in retaliation. Nevertheless, av'ta81KEtv itself does nothing of 
this kind, and as such its prohibition is simply a tautologous development of the 
prohibition of a81KEtv.41 
In order to avoid such difficulties, Harte 1999, 121-122 suggests: 'the a-priva-
tive in av'ta81KElv is interpretative, not descriptive. Socrates refers generally to 
acts of retaliation in response to being wronged, and analyses them as acts of 
wrongdoing in themselves. Only thus is Socrates' position one which the major-
ity would reject'. It certainly seems true that this type of understanding of 
av'ta81KEtV is needed to make sense of the majority dissension. Moreover, if as 
questions' . 
40 Cf. Lane 1998,319: 'the Crito's ban on retaliation has been criticized for its breadth and 
un specificity , . 
41 It might be objected that, even if this is applies to avmOtKElv, the prohibition of avnKCiK-
oUPYElv (49c4) really says something novel, since itself is not so obviously pejorative. especially 
when done in retaliation. Yet, if this is the case, the controversy surely lies with the previous ban of 
KCiKOUpyciv itself (49c2), that then entails the prohibition of aV1tKCiKOUPYEtV. 
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she claims, av'taolKElv is a neologism, we might also see it as a word-play that 
subtly attaches a notion of injustice to the traditional concept of justified retali-
taion (av'tlolKE1V). However, although such an interpretation appears to make 
room for a ban of retaliation itself, this leads to another set of problems, namely, 
that the prohibition is too general to be applicable. For there is still an absence of 
information as to where boundaries are drawn between just and unjust responses 
and how this fits this particular situation. 
The traditional approach to these questions seems to be to interpret Socrates' 
envisaged destruction of the Laws as the retaliatory injustice. Yet the Laws 
explicitly accuse Socrates of trying to overturn and destroy themselves and the 
city, actions that are not self-evidently unjust, but must be proved so by the 
Laws.42 The view that destruction of the Laws is necessarily an injustice seems to 
rest on the idea that words such as 'destruction', 'violence', or 'injury' are value-
terms. However, the Laws' terms, arroAEO"m and av£'t£'tpa<p8m (50b 1-5), are 
not self-evidently and unequi vocally pejorati ve (see 51 a3), and Socrates' 
intended actions remain to be proved unjust by the Laws. The question of 
whether the destruction of a legal system that may be at fault is legitimate or 
unjust surely remains at issue as the speech continues. 
To a certain extent, the Laws echo the points about av'ta01KElv in the first part 
of their speech, claiming that justice between them is not based on equality, and 
that Socrates is mistaken to think that it is just for him to reciprocate (aV't1rrOl£lv) 
their actions (50e4ff.). They compare the relationship between them to that of 
father and son or master and slave, in which the son or the slave must not speak 
back when rebuked (KaK&~ aKoDov'ta aV'tlAEYElV) or hit back when hit 
('turr't0IlEvov aV't1'tD1t't£1V). The Laws' prohibition of retaliation echoes the ear-
lier ban on aV1aolKElv, both thematically and verbally, in their repeated use of 
verbs with the av'tt prefix that expresses reciprocity, and this has led readers to 
equate the scenario described by the Laws with the actions that are prohibited by 
the ban on aV1aol KE1V .43 Yet the Laws only discuss retaliatiory instances of 
actions such as 1tOlE1V that are not in themselves unjust,44 whereas in the earlier 
42 Cf. Kraut 1984, 108: 'The Socratic prohibition of injustice is not a prohibition of violence. On 
the contrary, both Socrates and the Laws imply that violence can be justified, since they rule it out 
only in a limited range of cases: ... So the Laws have understood the Socratic prohibition of injustice 
rather well. They realize that it is not a point about destruction or violence. Alld they see that they 
cannot condemn Socrates simply 011 the grounds that escape is a destructive act'. Cf. Bostock 1990, 4 
that at 50a7-b8 the Laws 'do not asselt ... that it is wrong for Socrates [emphasis his], in his position, 
to seek to destroy the whole system of laws, and certainly they have not yet made any attempt to 
argue for it'. 
43 E.g., Barker 1977, 18-19: 'Socrates' projected action is treated under one of those categories 
explicitly listed as varieties of alhKlu in the earlier discussion (49B 10ff.): it is aVlt1toIE1V, 
avnAEYElV, anm'l1tlEIV, (50E9-51 AI), and must therefore lie under the prior ban on unuOlKE1V 
(49BIO, CI0, D8), uvnKuKouPYEtV (C4), ul!uw:cr8at aV1l0pii'lvlu KUKiii~ (D8-9). Just because it is 
intentionally inflicting harm for harm, however great the provocation and however slight the retalia-
tory effect, it is uOl1<lU and must not be chosen'. Cf. also Harte 1999, 124-125. 
44 Cf. Vlastos 1994, 90n8: 'but what is permissible at 50e6 is Unl1tOlEtV, lIot unuOlKEtV and 
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passages, the prohibition concerned acts of mutual injustice. Far from claiming 
that it is unjust for Socrates to retaliate against their unjust treatment of him, the 
Laws' point depends upon the fact that their initial action was in fact just, and 
that Socrates' retaliation alone is unjust (e.g., 51a3: Eav O'E E7ttxnpml1EV iWE'i~ 
a1tOAAuvat oiKmov ftYOUI1EVOl Etvat). 
Unlike Socrates' earlier point, the Laws are not talking here about responding 
to injustice in general terms, but specifically, about what constitutes justice and 
injustice in a certain case. They show how the prohibition of aOtKEtV applies in 
these particular circumstances and present a model of retaliation with very clear 
ideas about which side ofthe action is correct.45 
Thus, even if the ban on av'taOtKEtV is to be seen as a radical ban of retaliation, 
Socrates, in propria persona, does not provide an applicable account of what the 
notion of 'retaliation' entails. Furthermore, the Laws almost seem to trade upon 
the superficial similarities in order to emphasise the difference between their own 
case and the type of retaliatory injustice that this ban prohibits. It seems, there-
fore, that both the prohibition of aOtKEtV and the prohibition of av'taOtKEtV, even 
if not tautological, are too general to advance our understanding of what consti-
tutes injustice itself. This remains for the Laws, who proceed to develop the pro-
hibition of injustice within this context. 
The earlier part of the dialogue makes justice a moral imperative, but gives no 
indication of what designates the just or unjust act, while the Laws give us them-
selves and their sentences as a model of what constitutes justice in this particular 
situation. In this context, injustice for Socrates is to disobey the sentence of the 
Laws, so that the Laws' dictates come to have a normative value. So the Laws 
provide a model for applying the imperative of justice and prohibition of injus-
tice in this context. In fact, later in the speech, they claim that Socrates' former 
logoi have put them on a par with justice and virtue as the things that are most 
valuable for men (ft apE't1, Kat ft OtKawO'uvT\ 1tAdO''tou a~wv 1:Ot~ aVepo)1tm~ 
Kat 'to. vOl1tl1a Kat oi vOl1m: 53c7). 
IV. Justice as self-consistency in the Laws' speech 
Nevertheless, the question still remains of what basis the Laws have for claim-
ing an integral connection between their dictates and justice. In order to answer 
this it is helpful to consider a further difference between Socrates in propria per-
sona and Socrates as the Laws, namely, the difference in the significance of the 
av'ttKUKollP'YEtV, which are clearly ruled out at 54c2-3'. 
45 The Laws do accuse Socrates of returning 'injustice for injustice' at the very end of their 
speech: EuvllE E~EA.9n~ OU'tOl~ uiaxp&~ av'tulltK1lau~ 'tE KUt av'ttKuKOllp'f11aU~ (54c2-3). Yet, they 
have made it clear that Socrates has been treated unjustly by 'men' and not by themselves (54b9-c2). 
Clearly this is not a parallel situation to that described at the beginning of their speech, nor are they 
conceding that their own actions towards Socrates can be construed as acts of injustice. Contra Harte 
1999, 125, who argues that the view that av'ttltotEtV here is an example of av'tulltKEtv is 'confirmed, 
when ... the Laws refer back to this argument using Socrates' own terms (av'tulltKEtv and av'ttKuK-
ollpydv) at 54c2-3'. 
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self-consistency arguments that he uses. 
As is argued above, in both personae Socrates uses arguments that revolve 
around the degree to which erito's proposal will be inconsistent with Socrates' 
previous actions and beliefs. In the earlier arguments Socrates' principles are 
ostensibly independent of the actions or beliefs of the individual. Arguments 
such as, 'And I cannot, now that this has happened to us, discard the logoi I used 
to advance, but they seem to me much the same as ever, and I revere and honour 
the same ones as before' (46b), suggest that if Socrates escapes from prison, he 
will be contravening the logoi by which he has abided throughout his life. Never-
theless the fact that he has stood by these logoi is not itself the cause of their 
validity nor their applicability. A further implication of this is that the assessment 
of whether Socrates' proposed actions would be consistent with these logoi is 
independent of his prior adherence to them. Similarly, when Socrates tries to 
establish Crito's agreement for the principles of his argument at 48e3ff. and 
49c1lff., the validity of these principles will be unaffected by Crito's agreement 
or disagreement. 
The earlier principles such as the prohibition of injustice (49b7) are inherently 
linked to the good ('to KaAOV), since 'living well' (KaA&<;) and 'living justly' 
(OlKat&<;) are said to be identical (48b7ff.) and, conversely, it is always 'wrong' 
(KaKov) and 'shameful' (aioXpov) to do injustice (49b4ff.). These principles are 
invariable and self-standing moral imperatives, whose moral value is affected 
neither by the contingencies of the circumstances (49aS), nor by personal com-
mitment or agreement (cf. Woozley 1979,21-22). 
However, this is not the case for the Laws. As they themselves admit, the recti-
tude of their individual decisions is not guaranteed and they do not claim that 
their dictates are invariably just per se.46 At S1e8 they suggest that the individual 
is free to persuade them, if they have done wrong (d /l~ KaA&<; 'tt lWlOD/lEV), so 
that it is clearly possible that their decisions might not be right. Moreover, the 
fact that their system incorporates persuasion suggests that the workings of the 
Laws are in some way mind-dependent, as opposed to the objectivity of Socrates' 
earlier principles. Yet, if this is the case, it seems puzzling that they can neverthe-
less claim their demands for Socrates' absolute obedience to be legitimate. 
A possible solution to these difficulties lies in the passage in which the Laws 
try to show that Socrates is bound by their claim and which, as we have already 
seen, provides a clue to their ethical methodology. The Laws' claim that uncon-
ditional obedience to their dictates is a moral imperative for Socrates (SOc6) can 
be understood in terms of the apEOKEtv principle (Sle4) and the agreement in 
action (rp'Ycp, S2d6). Like Socrates in propria persona, Socrates as the Laws, also 
focuses on choice, putting much emphasis on the fact that the agreement to stay 
in Athens and abide by the Laws' pronouncements was not one made under com-
46 Cf. Vlastos 1995, 38-39; Alternatively, Bostock 1990, 18. suggests that 54b9-c2 indicates that 
the 'possibility of injustice' enters the legal system through human error and not via the Laws them-
selves. 
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pulsion, but a voluntary agreement from which a person could withdraw at any 
time (51d2ff.). However, in the Laws' case the justice both of this agreement and 
the apEOKElV principle depends upon the voluntariness of the agreement, and this 
is indicative of the difference in the reasoning being used in the earlier and later 
parts of the dialogue. The earlier principles are unaffected by individual actions 
or belief, whereas those within the Laws' speech are dependent upon those very 
things. 
Just like Socrates in propria persona, the Laws also argue that defiance of their 
dictates would be inconsistent with Socrates' behaviour throughout his life. Yet, 
unlike the earlier points, where the applicability and validity of the principle was 
unaffected by a person's actions and beliefs, in the Laws' speech it is the actions 
and beliefs (as inferred from actions) that directly affect the applicability of the 
principles. Thus, if we take the ad hominem aspect of the argument seriously (see 
Vlastos 1995,42; Weiss 1998, 163; West 1989, 78; Kahn 1989,35; White 1996, 
109), the proofs given and the debts claimed in this part of the dialogue actually 
point toward the method of ethical reasoning being employed here. My reading 
departs from those discussions of this passage that take the Laws' principles as a 
general imperative, exploring their political ramifications and whether these are 
consistent with the earlier prohibition of injustice.47 
The degree to which an individual is bound by the Laws of Athens varies 
according to their actions and the duration and degree of commitment that these 
imply, as is clear from the evidence (tEKIll1pta) given by the Laws (52blff.). The 
principle of absolute obedience to the sentences of the Laws cannot be used as an 
independent means of assessing whether escape would be just, but must be taken 
as part of Socrates' belief system as a whole, as demonstrated by his actions. 
Escape is not unjust simply because it contravenes this principle alone. Rather, 
obedience to this principle is the course of action that is most consistent with the 
beliefs implied by Socrates' actions throughout his life, and it is this that makes 
the principle just for Socrates and the escape that would contravene it unjust. 
The problem that is so often raised about the Laws' speech is the incompatibil-
ity of Socrates' absolute prohibition of injustice with the Laws' demands for 
absolute obedience to dictates that are not necessarily just. However, if we see 
the Laws' demands for obedience not in terms of individual dictates that are just 
per se, but in terms of an ad hoc and ad hominem notion of justice as self-consis-
tency, this problem can perhaps be avoided. For self-consistency hinges not on 
the simple compatibility of an action in itself with an independent principle in 
isolation from the individual agent, but on achieving the highest degree of coher-
ence within the entirety of an individual's beliefs, reflected in past and present 
actions as well as in actions envisaged for the future.48 Since actions are not inde-
pendently unjust, but only because inconsistent, it would therefore simply not be 
47 E.g., Kraut 1984, ch. 6 examines the 'argument from agreement' in general terms and says its 
'devastating defect' might be due to the fact that Socrates 'generalizes from his own case' (190-191); 
Woozley 1979,5; Allen 1984, 85ff. 
48 A consistency model of justice also makes room for the points in the latter part of the Laws' 
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open to the Laws to argue convincingly in such a case that obedience would be 
consistent and therefore just. 
The questions of the Crito are not generalised, but a deliberation firmly 
grounded within the context and contingencies of a practical situation-albeit a 
fictional representation. As Vlastos 1995, 38 says, the Athenian state is not 'a 
celestial society whose legal order could be counted on to be invariably just', but 
a human one, in which ethical conflicts may arise. Such a conflict is present in 
the very nature of Socrates' situation since he appears to accept as just the pun-
ishment for actions that he does not believe unjust. A consistency model of jus-
tice, without abstract and absolute ethical principles with which independent 
practical decisions simply conform or clash, provides a way of negotiating these 
difficulities. For, accordingly, both Socrates' initial actions and his acceptance of 
the sentence are those decisions that render his actions most consistent and there-
fore most just. 
Of course, there is stilI room for debate about how the Laws' demands in this 
context are consistent with Socrates' belief system,49 and whether self-consis-
tency itself is either necessary or sufficient for justice. The question of whether 
self-consistency per se is enough to confer moral or epistemic rectitude on a set 
of beliefs is much debated. For the Crito itself, the model of justice as self-con-
sistency, even if controversial, appears to provide a useful way of understanding 
the Laws' speech. 
Conclusion 
I have challenged the legitimacy of distinguishing betwcen Socrates' in pro-
pria persona arguments and the Laws' speech in terms of a reason/rhetoric oppo-
sition. This distinction cannot be drawn between them and is unsatisfactory since 
rhctorical structures of argument pervade both parts. Taken in an expanded 
sense, however, 'rhetoric' might be seen as the distinguishing feature of the 
Laws' speech. As an argumentative tool rhetoric aims at persuasion, a task 
attempted, as in the Crito, largely through showing the consistency of certain 
views with the beliefs of the individual. In propria persona Socrates uses just 
such tools to persuade Crito of principles whose morality is self-standing. And 
while in the Laws' speech it is purely the fact that the views being proposed arc 
consistent with Socrates' actions and beliefs that makes them moral, the rhetori-
speech of the effect of escape on friends and family, reputation and future occupation (53a9-54b2). 
This would then give more significance to some of the Laws' expressions such as 'to oxTi~a 'to 
oamou ~E1aAAa~a<; (53d7) and nOAAa Kat ava~ia oauTOU (53e4), as well as providing a possible 
objection to the contention that the Laws' concern with matters that Socrates appears to have dis-
missed as inconsequential (48c2-6) suggests a SocrateslLaws disjunction: see, e.g., Miller 1996, 128; 
Weiss 1998, 132 and 150; Harte 1999, 129. 
49 Pertinent to this issue is what constitutes the type of obedience that the Laws demand. Gallop 
1998, 258 suggests that it is the sentences and not all orders of the court to which the Laws claim 
Socrates' unconditional obedience. Another important point is the precise meaning of the distinction 
used by the Laws when they claim that Socrates will have been wronged 'not by us, the Laws, but by 
men' (54c 1-2). 
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cal fonn is essential to the ethical content. We might then see the Laws' speech 
as essentially 'rhetorical' since it represents a mind-dependent and subjective 
ethics, dependent on individual beliefs, unlike the absolute ethical principles of 
the earlier Crito. 
Yet to view the Laws as 'rhetorical' in this sense in no way precludes seeing 
them as reasoning. While it may be true to say that 'rhetoric' characterises both 
the argumentative structures and ethical system of the Laws' speech, this rhetoric 
is neither an inconsequential embellishment nor a hinderance to their reasoning. 
On the contrary, it could be said that the 'rhetoric' of the Laws' speech holds an 
essential key to its philosophy.5o 
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